Sewers.

How I loved a sewer visit. It is not everyone’s cup of tea I know, in fact it was rather like our hook ladders; a love or hate it thing; only here instead of going up you’re going down and normally wearing a ‘Proto’ oxygen breathing apparatus (BA) set.

It’s the late 1960s and I’m on Lambeth’s Red Watch. With four year’s operational experience under my belt I considered putting in for an emergency tender (ET) course. It was something I didn’t wanted to rush into as I felt it was necessary to get some decent BA jobs under your belt before making such a move. Historically, London Fire Brigade ET crews were generally held in very high esteem and were expected to ‘deliver the goods’ at any difficult BA job or at special operations requiring BA. That was in addition to their wider specialist rescue role. This ‘gaining experience’ view was not always shared by other watches at Lambeth. Some equally young firemen (I was only 22) put in for their ET course as soon as they had passed out in Proto BA. They argued that they would gain the necessary experience by riding the ET. This was not a view held by the Red Watch’s ET men, the very firemen I would ride along-side if sucessful on the examable course.

By the late 1960s the ET crews were seen by many senior officers as “Leete’s commandos.” In the 1950s the Brigade only had two; one at Lambeth and the other at Clerkenwell. These crews would have to combat their individual fears of hot confined humid spaces, face the risk of a sudden unexpected explosion of flammable gases or liquids whilst still working as an elite crew. They supported, and contributed, to the combined efforts that gave fire-ground crews their unique synergy.

Lambeth’s emergency tender crew showing its array of equipmen in the mid 1950s.

Occasionally it was their skill that could make the difference between life and death in the rescue of a trapped BA fireman. In such situations it required every ounce of the ET crews’ combined expertise. It was not the place for a mere novice, a view of those that rode Lambeth’s ET on Red’s. So, it was with their blessing that I put in for the next possible course nomination. The course came through almost immediately, supported by my guvnor’s endorsement, but not before our monthly salary slips changed from pounds, shillings and pence (£. s. d) to pounds and pence on Monday 15th February 1971.

I attended the Southwark Training School for my three week ET course. Southwark was then the centre of all the Brigade’s ET training. It serviced the seven Greater London ET stations’ qualification needs. The course incorporated intensive BA training and covered the rigorous and demanding roles expected of its crews, this included visits to specialist installations and premises. One of these visits was to the London’s sewer system. Later on in my my career taking crews on a sewer visit became a bit of a party piece when I was stationed at Southwark, West Norward and Brixton fire stations.

Southwark, the London Fire Brigade’s home for the training of its emergency tender crews, as here in the 1920s.

We were taken to Southwark’s Cornwell Road, adjacent to the South Bank, where we were greeted by the ‘Ganger’ of one of the then GLC’s sewer crews. We were soon introduced to their subterranean world. The sweaty brickwork of the tunnel closed in on us no sooner than we squeezed down through the open manhole cover opening and descended the vertical metal ladder, a ladder that took us thirty feet below London’s streets. The hot and humid smell of detergent contrasted with the cold flowing water around our feet. This first visit was without any BA, a familiarisation of this strange, and at times, amazing place the sewer men spent their working day. With each step the dull turgid screen of mist parted to allow us through. Shafts of light from our torches picked out the glistening highlights of geometrical lines of brickwork, creating their own claustrophobic son-et-lumiere with each step we made. Distorted shadows transformed us into phantoms wandering in an aquatic underground maze.

We were wading along the tunnels in single file. Cold greyish water flowed eastwards and at knee height pushed against the backs of our waders, urging us on. We could not walk upright, the egg-shaped tunnel was only five foot high. Cramped, we moved at a stoop, the shadows mirroring our movements on the brickwork. After a while the Ganger, at the head of the file, turned around.

“Keep in your place,” he said, “and if you get lost, then don’t start doing anything clever like trying to find us. Just stay where you are, we’ll find you.”

The Ganger was the head of a team of five flushers. They spent their working hours cleaning the bowels of London. He had on heavy waders that came up to his waist. Beneath them he wore thick thigh length woollen socks like leg warmers. Above the waders and the leg warmers he was garbed in a blue jacket, kept in place by a belt and the all-important safety harness. Although the tunnel we were trudging through was egg-shaped, the sewer bed was flat covered by a layer of sediment that felt like sand and grit; our boots sank into it with every step.

“That’s what we call muck down here,” the Ganger said. “It’s full of little pockets of gas, waiting to overpower the unsuspecting sewer worker. That’s why if you ever get called to get us out of one of these tunnels only ever come down in your breathing apparatus, otherwise we will all be in the shit, literally.”

From that simple inconspicuous manhole cover we had entered just one of the very many miles of sewers running through the metropolis. Twisting and turning, beneath the roadways, fifteen hundred miles of neo-gothic sewers run below London streets, some much smaller than the ones we were in that day. Others were almost like caverns; storm relief sewers that direct away millions of gallons of rain water, thus protecting the capital from potential flood damage, during torrential rainfall.

On our second visit we were wearing Proto breathing apparatus sets. A different manhole this time and located near the Elephant and Castle. After a forty foot descent we entered a tunnel no taller than four foot tall. Our backs started to ache within the first 100 feet. The bottom of our breathing bags dragging through the sewer water. As we negotiated this subterranean waterway we were conscious that a rain cloud bursting some miles away might quickly fill these tunnels with torrents of water. Easily sweeping away the unwary worker. The only protection against this possibility was the ‘Top-man’, and his two-way radio, who gave regular weather forecast updates. Which for those working below could mean the difference between life and death.

London firemen on their ET course at Southwark-wearing the Proto oxygen breathing apparatus set and navigating the ‘Rat-run’ in Southwark’s BA chamber.

We practised the rescue techniques necessary to lift, carry and raise an Injured/unconscious sewer worker. Later in the comfort of the classroom we supplemented our practical experience by learning of the health and biological hazards such rescues can expose the rescuer too. These include Weil’s disease, spread by rats’ urine, the virus of which can get into the body through cuts and scratches and end up in the brain and in most cases leading to an unpleasant death. Hepatitis is more common but is not the only organic peril since other bacteria will cause a range of potentially life-threatening conditions. It is therefore vital that the washing and decontamination procedures are rigorously followed, after the crews return to street level. Just as potentially lethal are the reaction of different chemicals mixing in the sewer system possibly producing a cocktail of toxic gases. Hence the importance of the sewer safety lamp which has been designed to warn of its presence.

The ET course was very “hands on”. We lifted, pulled, cut, spread with the full range of rescue equipment the ETs’ carried. We also visited various lift installations and learnt how to recognise the differences between electrical, mechanical and hydraulic systems. How to shut them down and hand-wind the lifts; how to open or remove lift doors and release the “dead” brakes so that we would be able to move a lift either up or down. These explorations covered the London Underground system too; we learnt the lifting points on varied rolling stock, how to isolate the electrical power supply to the tracks. We went beneath escalators; we entered cold store refrigeration plants (where the hairs in our nostrils froze solid within seconds). We performed drills wearing the full protective clothing only the ETs carried, and which will be the fireman’s only protection when dealing with serious leakages of toxic gases and refrigerants such as ammonia.

The sewer pipe in Southwark’s BA chamber-there was a small round sewer pipe too!

At the end of all this intensive course participants, Sub Officers, Leading Firemen and Firemen were extensively examined by the Training School ET senior officers. Every aspect of the course was covered. Attendance alone was no guarantee to gain a pass on this demanding course. A genuine camaraderie was established between us all. It helped ensure that the high standards expected were met. Finally, armed with our new skills and knowledge, we returned to our respective stations to put it all into practice, or so we hoped.

In the end I did actually attend two sewer incidents whilst riding the ET. One was in Brixton Road and the other in North London. Brixton Road was a sewer collapse and the lads from Brixton, under the command of their Irish born Station Officer, Declan Butler, did an exceptional job of extracting the injured sewer workers, whilst we just helped.

North London was a long way to travell from Lambeth and by the time we arrived it was done and dusted. Another good job done the local station crews. But the local sewer gangs around South London were always willing to give us a visit, although there were a few on the various White Watch crews I took along who did not share my enthusiasm for seeing what lay under their feet!

The only two London firemen to perish in a sewer incident. They had entered wearing ‘smoke-hoods’ and were asphyxiated. Their deaths brought about the change to self-contained ‘Proto’ breathing apparatus.

Today’s London firefighters, wearing the breathing apparatus that they would wear when committed to any sewer incident.

Smithfield…The Meat Market Fire, January 1958.

In the early hours of Thursday 23^rd January 1958, local firemen arrived at the Smithfield Meat Market. By the time the blaze was finally contained, days later, two members of the London Fire Brigade were dead and a further twenty-six firemen were hospitalised.

On their arrival the fire was discovered to be deep within the basement labyrinth. The crews from Clerkenwell fire station were among the first on site. Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells (47) and Fireman Richard Daniel Stocking (31) would head down into the dense smoke wearing breathing apparatus. Smoke completely filled the extensive basement. Tragically, they would never returned to the surface alive.

After 25 hours, and around 3am on the Friday morning, flames engulfed the ground floor of the Market. The intense heat and flammable gasses erupted from the basement and fire quickly consumed the entire Poultry Market. As the flames reached over 100 feet high it was decided that the fire was too fierce to extinguish and the brigade began focusing their efforts on protecting the surrounding buildings.

The ‘stop’ message was received at 16:45 hrs on Friday 24th January. Over 700 oxygen cylinders had been used by some 400 firemen wearing ‘Proto’ breathing apparatus during the three days of firefighting operations. A total attendance of more than 1700 officers and firemen, with 389 pumps and other appliances attended from 56 of the LCC’s 58 fire stations. This was in addition to some from surrounding fire brigades. The final brigade appliance withdrew from the scene on the 7^th February.

The Smithfield meat market building on the morning of the fire. 23rd January 1958.

The original Smithfield Poultry Market was designed by Sir Horace Jones. The London Central (Smithfield) Markets, of which the poultry market was part, consisted of four buildings of almost equal size. They covered an area of around ten acres. Each one some 250 ft by 240 ft. Of particular note were the basements to these buildings which were slightly larger due to them running under the adjacent pavements. The building where the fire originated started was known as The Poultry Market.

At the time of the fire it was estimated that around 800 tons of poultry, game and meat was stored at the market. The single story buildings were constructed of load bearing brick walls with ornamental towers around 70ft high at the corners and centres of buildings. It had a pitched slate on boarding roof, wired louvers topped the structure. The roof was supported on cast iron columns and beams. None of these beams were protected against fire.

The basement was constructed with a concrete floor. The ground floor, which was about 2ft. thick, was formed from brick arches and covered with 8 inch thick stone slabs. Inside the building the galleries and ground floor were partitioned to form offices and shops. The partitions were built from timber, lath and plaster on timber studwork, breeze blocks rendered with plaster. The basement had been divided into around 90 storage compartments. Many had been divided further into sub-compartments. Whilst some compartments were accessible via doors from basement corridors, others could only be accessed by entering through trapdoors in the ground floor of the market. Access in the basement was further reduced by a railway tunnel which ran diagonally through it. This tunnel was bridged at 2 points using stepped crossovers, but these crossovers had limited headroom.

The basement plan of Smithfield meat market. (The Firefighter Magazine extract.)

Some access to the basement was available by electric lifts within the building and trapdoors which were set in the pavement outside. Further entry to the basement could be made via tunnels that were used to pass refrigerated air use to cool the basement. These tunnels contained heavy insulated doors that formed air locks to help prevent the escape of cold air. One large section of the basement was insulated with slab cork covered with cement, elsewhere the basement was insulated with granulated cork, slab cork or slag wool held in place with timber studwork or match boarding. A large amount of bituminous sheeting was used in conjunction with the insulation.

One London fireman’s story.
Fireman John Bishop had started his career in the London Fire Brigade in February 1949, at the age of 20. He had previously served six years at sea in the Merchant service having joined at just 14 years of age! This red haired young fireman started his days at Clerkenwell, the Divisional headquarters of the former LCC B Division, which cover the City of London and the East End. It was one of four Divisional stations which covered the London Fire Brigade’s 58 stations. It was here he learned his craft alongside war-time firemen and those returning from active duty in WWII serving with the armed forces.

John, or ‘Ginger’ as he was known learnt his craft the hard way; especially after he ended up in hospital for several days after attending a refuse lorry fire in a council yard. By 1954 he was promoted to Leading Fireman and remained at Clerkenwell. It was on the 11^th May 1954 that Clerkenwell’s pump-escape and pump were called to a fire at Langley Street, off Covent Garden. It was fate that saved John from possible death and certain serious injury that day. The crews had been called to a five storey warehouse, approximately 45 ft. x 100 ft. packed with crates and market materials. The building had recently been fumigated with a paraffin-based chemical. Whilst two firemen stayed outside to operate the pump seven others, led by Station Officer Frederick Hawkins, went inside to deal with the small fire. Leading Fireman Bishop was detailed to walk around the back of the warehouse as the others entered and climbed the stairs. Suddenly the fumes inside exploded. The resultant shock waves brought the roof down. The shingled roof covering was still reinforced with cobble stones which had been placed on top during the war as protection against incendiary bombs. The whole lot came crashing down burying all those on the stairs. The dead and injured were entombed in tons of debris. Whilst assistance was summoned John and his two colleagues fought desperately to reach their fallen colleagues.

The Langley Street warehouse blaze in 1954. As crews entered the building the roof collapsed with fatal consequences. Station Officer Hawkins and fireman Batt-Rawden were both killed by the fall of debris. Fireman Gadd died later as a result of his injuries. 1954

Station Officer Frederick Hawkins and Fireman, A. E. J. Batt-Rawden died at the scene. Five other firemen were seriously injured. Sub Officer Sidney Peen, Leading Fireman Ernest Datlin and Firemen Kenneth Aylward, Frederick Parr, Richard Daniel Stocking and Charles Gadd were all removed to hospital where Charles Gadd later died from his injuries. Three of the injured required plastic surgery treatment. Leading Fureman John Bishop escaped with bruises.

By January 1958 John Bishop had been promoted to Sub Officer rank. On the 23 January he was the acting Station Officer in charge of the Red Watch at Whitefriars fire station and whose ground adjoined the Smithfield Meat Market complex. The first call to the Brigade was received at 02.18 a.m. It was to a fire at ‘The Union Cold Storage’ premises in Smithfield Street. The Lambeth control room, located in the basement of the Brigade Headquarters, mobilised Clerkenwell’s pump-escape, pump and emergency tender together with Whitefriars pump plus Cannon Street’s turntable ladder. It was evident on arrival that there was fire within the basement. The problem was finding it.

Bishop’s crew was the first to arrive at the Smithfield Meat Market fire. He, together with another fireman, were preparing to investigate the thick smoke coming up from the markets basement when Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells from Clerkenwell arrived. As it was Fourt-Wells’s ground, and he was the substantive Station Officer, he immediately took charge. His first objective was to find the extent and seat of the fire. He was aided in his task by having not only firemen using breathing apparatus carried on the two pumps but the special breathing apparatus crew riding his station’s emergency tender. Fourt-Wells not only had difficulty in assessing the extent of the fire, but how to gain an effective access to it. Eight minutes after his arrival, and with no swift resolve in locating the fire, Fourt-Wells sent the first assistance message making pumps four.

Station Officer Fourt-Wells had been taken by an employee to the plant room tunnel. Here he encountered thick smoke. Returning to the surface Fourt-Wells, rigged in his breathing apparatus set, and joined by his emergency tender crew, returned below to investigate further. The BA team entered the tunnel and attempted to locate the source of the smoke. The plant room tunnel was searched but no fire was found. Information was received that the fire could be in the main basement where access to it was secured by a padlocked door. Eventually the crew found the door and were provided with a key. By this time the crew were running low on oxygen. (Of the 5 crew members, one gauge read 10 atmospheres, one gauge read 5 atmospheres and the another gauge was on zero atmospheres.) Three of the firemen left the basement and reported their Station Officer say “leave the door open I‘m just, going to take a look”. Within minutes of the exiting men leaving the basement the alarm was raised as the others had not surfaced. However, due to the complex nature of the basernent, it was almost an hour before the bodies of Station Officer Fourt-Wells and Firefighter Stocking were located and carried out.

John Bishop was interviewed about the fire by Channel 4 Television some years ago. In it he related the early stages of the Smithfield fire;

“When the first pumps arrived, thick acrid smoke was pouring out of the market’s maze of underground tunnels leading to cold storage rooms.” “With the arrival of senior officers from the B Divisional headquarters at Clerkenwell, Fourt-Wells although in command he and his crew members were in the basement.”

John Bishop recalls the moment; “Clerkenwell’s Station Officer and a fireman had headed down into the dense smoke, never to be seen alive again”.

Breathing apparatus sets typical of those worn at the Smithfield blaze.

Station Officer Fort-Wells and ET fireman Dick Stocking had entered the fire wearing their Mark IV proto oxygen breathing apparatus sets, sets that their pre-war counterparts had worn in the 1920s. In those early stages, with six BA carrying pumps and two emergency tenders in attendance increasing numbers of firemen, wearing breathing apparatus, were committed to find and attack the blaze. John Bishop and his pump’s crew would be one of scores of teams to enter the Smithfield labyrinth. Again he relates his story;

“It was a maze and we used clapping signals. I was going down the centre and I’d send men down a passageway here and there. You would walk along one step at a time, with the back of your hand in front of you in case you walked into something red-hot, making sure you were not going to fall down a hole. All we could find was passageways with meat packed either side from floor to ceiling. The smoke got thicker – you could eat it; black oily smoke. It was very cold down there and you were cold, even though you were sweating. That was fear.”

Firemen entering the basement of the Smithfield Market that had already cost the lives of two firemen, Station Officer Jack Forte-Wells and Fireman Richard Stocking. 1958

John Bishop would be reunited with his former Clerkenwell workmate, Dick Stocking, for the very last time as he led his Whitefriars crew in search of the two missing men. There was intense activity as the frantic search got underway, but it is highly likely that other lives were saved by the coolness of Assistant Divisional Officer Lloyd (the first senior officer to arrive) who checked the oxygen cylinder contents of each rescuer as they entered into the basement. Even so, many still put their own lives at risk by having less than half of their full cylinder content as they descended below ground.

It was a crew from Manchester Square who located Fourt-Wells. He was found under packages and carcasses of meat not far from their entry point. His mouthpiece was on laying on the floor and he was lifeless. They started to return his body to the surface but were relieved of their gruelling, unenviable, task by other BA firemen.

Bishop, and his team, found Stocking against a blank wall in a dead-end passageway. He showed no signs of life. On his return to the exit Bishop had to hand the task of recovery to other firemen as his own oxygen supply had by now expired but he made it back out.

For the next 24 hours crews struggled to come to terms with the blaze. The cold January air turned to excessive heat as crew after crew combated the dense smoke and worsening conditions. Such were the arduous, physically punishing, conditions that BA crews could not work for more than 10-15 minutes at a time. Despite the determination of the firemen the complexity of the basement, the manner of its flammable insulation and stored meat products, the intensity of the fire was able to spread through much of the two and a half acre maze of underground passages aided by air-ducts and concealed ceiling voids. The dominance of the fire below ground forced superheated gases and smoke up into the street, heat through which the firemen had to struggle against when bringing jets to bear though some of the pavement openings and external trapdoors.

Station Officer Cliff Colenutt, with colleague Don Burrell, taking a break between their attacks on the basement fire.

Smithfield was a blaze which had robbed the London Fire Brigade of two of its own. It was a Clerkenwell fireman, who knew Fort-Wells that described him as;

“One of the old `smoke eaters’ who would not give up hunting for the seat of a fire…”

Smithfield worker, George Goodwin, was an apprentice butcher working at Smithfield. He worked at a small family butchers at 59 Long Lane. It was situated at the top end of the market and as he arrived for work in the early hours of that Thursday morning already there was a lot of police activity and plenty of fire engines at the Poultry Hall. Smoke was rising from the vents in the walkway outside the market. Long Lane was closed off and the meat carrying lorries were cleared from their positions backed onto the entrances to the market to a place of safety.

A young fireman’s face, that of Brian ‘Bill’ Butler, was captured by a photographer of the national press and was featured in reports of the blaze. (Daily Mirror)

As he watched the situation changed, more and more fire engines arrived. The smoke got thicker and blacker and hung over the market like a cloud. Not recalling exactly when but rumours started to surface that there were a number of firemen hurt, possibly some killed. The meat workers we were kept away from the activities taking place but he wrote how he was “relieved I was not a fireman.”

Crowds of market men, in their long blue or white bloodied smocks, stood watching as the firemen battled with the fire after the tragedy unfolded.

Timeframe of the Smithfield fire.

0218. Call to the Union Cold Store-Smithfield Street. B20 (Clerkenwell) PE. P. ET B36 (Whitefriars) P B35 (Cannon Street) TL
0230. From Station Officer Fourt-Wells. Make pump four. B36 (Whitefriars) PE and B33 (Redcross Street) P plus A4 (Euston) AFS Pump ordered. ADO Lloyd and DO Shawyer attending from B Div HQ (Clerkenwell)
O246. From DO Shawyer. Considerable amount of smoke issuing from basement store, market section. No fire yet. BA men searching.
0253. From DO Shawyer. Second ET required to stand-by. D61 (Lambeth) ET ordered.
0255. From DO Shawyer. A building of 2 floors and basement, about 300 ft x 300 ft, part of basement alight.
0307. Ex Tele call to Lambeth Control. Fire Charterhouse Street. (DO Shawyer informed.)
0315. From DO Shawyer. Making an entrance at Charterhouse Street.
0318. From DO Shawyer. Making entry from two different sides of the fire. Smithfield Street and Charterhouse Street. The fire has not yet been located. 4 additional pumps with BA required to stand-by. A4 (Euston) P from Clerkenwell. B32 (Bishopsgate) P from Whitefriars. B27 (Shoreditch) P and D62 (Southwark) P.
0325. From DO Shawyer. Fire located on Charterhouse Street side of incident.
0342. From ACO Cunningham at Smithfield Street make pumps 8. A1 (Manchester Square) P from Clerkenwell. D64 (Old Kent Road) P from Whitefriars. B33 (Redcross Street) PE. B35 (Cannon Street) PE. Brig HQ (Lambeth) CU. A1 (Manchester Square) HLL.
0347. From ACO Cunningham. 3 emergency lights required. Extent of fire still not known, access being made from all available points.
Deputy Chief Leete mobile to incident.
0356. CU arrived and in control. (R/T 20)
0408. From ACO Cunningham. Make pumps 12. B37 (Holloway) P from Redcross Street. A10 (Kensington) from Clerkenwell. B29 (Burdett Road) from Whitefriars. D66 (Brixton) P from Cannon Street. (*On the make pumps 12; 4 PEs, 13 Ps plus 1 AFS pump would be in attendance.)
0433. From Chief Officer. Order CaV at once with refreshments for 100 men. (D61 Lambeth CaV ordered.)
0448. From Chief Officer. Second ambulance required at Smithfield Market.
0459. From Chief Officer. 10 BA pumps required as relief at 0600hrs. (B21 Islington, B24 Homerton, B26 Bethnal Green, B31 Shadwell, C42 Deptford, C43 East Greenwich, C50 Lewisham, D63 Dockhead, D60 Clapham, A3 Camden Town.)
0500. From Chief Officer. Make ambulances 4.
0507. From the Chief Officer. Fm Stropp removed to hospital.
0514. From the Chief Officer Station Officer Fourt–Wells and Fireman Stocking (B20) overcome by smoke and removed to hospital by ambulance. (They were pronounced dead upon arrival.)

Friday 24^th 1645. Stop message sent.

The London Fire Brigade of the late 1950s comprised of only three principal officers; the Chief Officer and his two Assistant Chief Officers (one nominated his deputy). All three remained in constant attendance in excess of 24 hours before either the deputy (Mr Leete) or the ACO (Mr Cunningham) was order to take charge of another major fire in Bermondsey.
Delve was no stranger to major fires. However, the Smithfield fire would prove to be a ‘watershed’ for the Brigade’s breathing apparatus procedures (procedures that had ramifications for the whole UK fire service. For Delve, and his men, Smithfield it would be one of the most difficult breathing apparatus incidents faced in their recent peacetime history. Sadly, Delve a stranger to men dying on his ‘watch. Nine firemen and officers had died in the line of duty since the end of the World War II.

When the Chief Officer first arrived at Smithfield he was greeted by his crews facing thickening smoke and arduous conditions. BA crews were working underground in relays seeking out the fire and attacked it wherever possible. The two emergency BA crews where now situated at both entry points, ready to be committed to seek out colleagues in difficulty or find those who were overdue. Additionally a further emergency crew stood by at the Brigade’s Control Unit, ready to replace the other emergency teams should they be required to enter the basement.

The crews at Smithfield were relived at about four hour intervals plus at the change of watch at 0900 and 1800 hrs on the 23^rd. Delve had discovered that his officer’s attempts to get a feel of the layout of the basement were seriously hampered due to the lack of employee knowledge about its layout and locked doors.

Delve consolidated the work of Divisional Officer’s Shawyer and Cunningham. Yet despite all their attempts to direct the extinguishment of the flames, and the tenacity of Delve’s firemen undertaking the task, (a task which had them working in the most challenging of conditions) the fire was gaining a firm hold. It was spreading throughout the basement. Such were the conditions during the morning of the 23rd crews had to be withdrawn from the Charterhouse Street entrance. All efforts were now concentrated on the West Smithfield tunnel entrance. With day shift (Blue Watch crews) now fully engaged, attempts were made to create fire breaks in the flammable insulation by teams of firemen. Large areas were painstakingly cut away from the basement walls and ceiling. This was all to no avail as the fire continued on its path of destruction.

Flooding the basement was attempted and water was applied from every possible vantage point. The Chief later reported that 500,000 gallons an hour was being pumped into the basement. (Individual pump capacity in 1958 was in the range of 500-750 gpm.) However, the drains disposed of the water before it could make any significant impact on the fire. Later the flooding was abandoned as large quantities of water was penetrating nearby underground railway tunnels.

Still with no noticeable effect from the previous firefighting efforts, by the late afternoon of the 23^rd Delve chose to push the fire back from the Charterhouse Street side towards the lift shaft in West Smithfield from where, it was hoped, the fire would vent itself. The attack was made by fresh crews who inched their way into the basement. By this point the heat was so great that crews could not work for more than 10-15 minutes. Even then many were overcome by the heat. They were assisted, or carried, towards the entry point by colleagues. Colleagues who were themselves affected by the heat. Semi-collapsed firemen had to be hauled up the lift shaft by line before being removed to St Bart’s hospital by ambulance. Yet, despite the attrition rate of his firemen Delve pushed on with these tactics to advance the attack on the fire. However, as the heat and conditions below ground grew ever more severe the attackers were slowly forced back. Finally, Delve withdrew his men before they were overwhelmed entirely.

As night fell, and the Red Watch firemen returned to the scene, it was hoped that the thickness of the ground floor, at almost 3 feet, would contain the fire. It proved not to be the case. Late on Thursday evening the first breach in the ground floor became evident. Jets positioned to contain the fire spread proved ineffectual. In the early hours of Friday morning parts of the ground floor collapsed allowing for a massive escape of superheated gases and flame to spread upwards. Crews working inside the Market building were withdrawn. The intensity of the fire was such that the cast-iron columns lost their structural integrity raising fears of the collapse of the roof, which later transpired.

Radial branches, large powerful ground jets, had to be deployed to deliver water to the heart of the massive blaze.

Delve, in anticipation of such developments had previously ordered radial branches to the scene. It remains highly probable that at this point in excess of 20 pumps were actively engaged in containing the fire to the Poultry Market despite pumps not being increased beyond 12!

As the fire let forth its full ferocity it rabidly consumed all before it. It was fuelled by the insulated match boarding wood, wool, bituminous tar which had become deeply contaminated and impregnated with animal fats through the years of lack of service and maintenance. The physics of the now rapidly spreading fire was aided by the fact that the ground floor had a smaller footprint than that of the basement below it. Therefore, it acted as a chimney allowing the furnace like temperatures to overwhelm the firemen’s attempts to contain it.

Again, Delve was forced to withdraw his crews and they had to surround the blaze. There was no saving the Poultry Market. In the darkness of that January morning the ornate corner distinctive towers collapsed in spectacular fashion, the falling balls of flame adding to the pyre below.

At its height the 13 jets and 12 radial branches, fed by 10 pumps and supplied by 18 street hydrants, were throwing 16,000 gallons of water per minute onto the blaze. It was left to the day watch to see the blaze subdued, not least because it had consumed all the available fuel. It was late afternoon that the STOP message was finally sent. Then the more mundane activity of damping down and eliminating hot spots started. The Brigade would remain at the scene in ever decreasing numbers until the 7^th February. It was during ‘damping down’ that Fireman Handey (Bishopsgate) suffered serious injuries when he fell through the floor into the basement.

The Lambeth control room staff had not only handled the challenging Smithfield fire in the period 23^rd -25^th January but also mobilised the Brigade to a further 259 separate incidents. In addition the Brigade dealt with 7 four pump fires, 1 six pump fire, plus an eight pump fire on the 24^th in an office block in Southwark Street. This was followed by a fifteen pump at a Jam factory in Rouel Road, Bermondsey and a further twenty pump fire in the early hours of the 25^th in a rubber dump/derelict warehouse, Poplar High Street, East London. Here both the West Ham and Essex fire brigades had to come to the aid of their London colleagues.

The aftermath.
The City of London Inquest was open and adjourned on the 24 January. The Coroner, Mr J, Milner-Holme. MA. approving the funerals of Jack Fourt-Wells and Richard Stocking.

The funeral procession of the two Clerkenwell men took place on the 30^th January. Station Officer Jack Fourt-Wells and Fireman Richard Stocking were each carried on a wreath laden turntable ladder. Leaving Clerkenwell fire station with its honour guard the fire engines bearing the men’s’ flagged draped coffins led the cortège through the Smithfield Meat Market before moving on the South London Crematorium at Streatham passing the Brigade Headquarters with it honour guard en-route. The men’s funeral service was conducted by the Rev. D.F.Strudwick, himself a serving London AFS fireman.

The full inquest of the two men took place on the 28^th February and lasted two and half days. Mrs Fourt-Wells’s interests being represented by Andrew Phelen QC on behalf of the Fire Officer Association. Mrs Stocking by Rose Heibron QC on behalf of the Fire Brigade Union and Mr Davis QC representing the London County Council. Rose Heilbron QC. was a legal pioneer in post war Britain. She practised mainly in personal injury and criminal law and was the second woman to be appointed a High Court judge. But in February 1958, at the request of the Fire Brigade Union solicitors, she looked after the interests of the Stocking family. Both Fourt-Wells and Stocking where found to have died from asphyxia due to the inhalation of fire fumes (carbon monoxide poisoning) when trapped in the unventilated maze of underground chambers below Smithfield. Issues arose as to whether the men had proper supervision. Rose Heilbron placed both Brigade’s officers, including Delve, and the world renowned pathologist, Dr Keith Simpson, under detailed technical questioning. She left no stone unturned.

The jury returned verdicts of ‘misadventure’ on the two deaths. The Coroner recommended the adoption of an automatic warning device designed to be fitted to the breathing apparatus set which would sound when the oxygen was running low. The Coroner did not wish to look into the origin of fire and the cause of the blaze was never ascertained. In his recommendations he also requested the installations of a ‘dry’ sprinkler system installation in similar locations. Finally he also required that a low cylinder warning device should be attached to BA sets and further recommended that the LFB do so in a timescale of 2-3 weeks.

Breathing apparatus procedures.
Following Smithfield reports were submitted the Fire Brigade Committee of the London County Council by Delve. Once again lessons were to be learned. Some of the problems which occurred at Smithfield, regarding BA procedures, had occurred at two previous fires at Covent Garden. Although a local (LFB) procedure was set up by 1956 following the second fatal Covent Garden Fire. This involved the provision of a BA Control Point. At Smithfield this was in Charterhouse Lane to record the entry of men wearing BA into the incident. The Control Point consisted of no more than blackboard and chalk. It recorded: Name, Station/location, Time of entry and Time due out.

The blaze, at the premises of Smithfield; Union Cold Storage Co, burned for three days in the centuries-old laby rinth before it eventually collapsed. Picture taken: 23rd January 1958 showing the recording of breathing apparatus crews.

At Smithfield this procedure proved invaluable. It indicated, later, in the incident that two men were missing and overdue. However, following the tragic loss of life at Smithfield there were concerted calls for a more comprehensive schedule of BA procedures to be formulated. These calls came from Delve, Leete, his Deputy, and Mr John Horner, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union. Later that same year Fire Service Circular (FSC) 37/1958 was issued. It detailed the findings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommended the following:- Tallies for BA sets; A Stage I and Stage II control procedure for recording & supervising BA wearers: The duties of a control operator: The procedure to be followed by crews: A main control procedure.

In the accompanying letter to the circular Brigades were requested to report their observations and recommendations in light of experience by the end of November 1959. There was at the time no specifications for the design and use of guide or personnel lines. It was considered that more experience had to be gained! Recommendations were, however, made in respect of a specification for a low cylinder pressure warning device and a distress signal device.

Finally, and in light of the views of Fire Brigades following Smithfield and based on their own experiences, it was clear that the use of BA would require more men to be better trained in its use and the safety procedures. Subsequent guidance on the selection of BA wearers was provided in FSC 32/1960 after agreement at the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council on 27 July 1960. It recommended:-18 months operational service before BA training. A possible age limit for wearers. Standards of fitness. Two BA wearers per appliance equipped with BA.

Finally.
A special word of thanks to Dave Goldsmith for sharing some of his extensive archive material in the completion of this narrative. Other information has been taken directly from to documents held at the Metropolitan Archives FB/GEN/2/124 Fire at Poultry Market, Central Markets Smithfield E.C.1 – 23/1/58″.

The incident remains listed as a 12 pump fire! However the early attendance on the 23^rd lists 18 pumping appliance (inc 1 AFS pump) plus specials. It was possibly a cultural thing back then, requesting additional appliances rather than making up? It was common pactice in the 1950s and 60s for senior/principal officers to request additional pumps to stand-by at the Control Unit then use them, especially in protracted BA operations. 10-12 pumps fire with twice as many machines in attendance was not without precedent in the LFB.

It also appears the Smithfield records are incomplete. Sight of the original fire report for Smithfield could clarify some these discrepancies. The LCC/LFB classifies the incident as a 20 pump make-up, which given the statement of Delve to the Coroner and the LCC’s Fire Brigade Committee supports this view. His own figures provides for an average attendance of 20 pumps at 3-4 hourly intervals over the 23^rd to the 24^th. The 13 jets and 12 radial branches used required the attendance of more than the official ‘12 pumps’ to deliver that amount of water.

Lastly, it was stated, anecdotally, that at one point that smoke from the Smithfield fire travelled through the catacombs into the basement of St Bart’s and the hospital authorities even considered evacuation. However, this was not mentioned in any LFB reports.

There were errors made at Smithfield, but they have to be set in the context of excepted practices of the time. As tragic as the deaths were the sacrifice was not in vain. Lessons were learnt. They helped developed better BA procedures. It remains both unfortunate and regrettable that it took their deaths to bring about such change.

End.

A history of breathing apparatus in London’s fire brigades.

The plip-plop of mica in the breathing tubes.

Smoke hoods.

It might come as a surprised just how early a system which allowed firemen to work in smoke was first used. In London early attempts to protect firemen, when entering smoke, were imported from France. A smoke-proof ‘dress’, that was created by M. Paulin, was one suggestion that found considerable favour.

Lieut-Colonel Pauline was the commander of the corps of Sapears Pompiers (fire brigade) in Paris. It was his design that crossed the Channel and adopted by its London equivalent force, the London Fire Engine Establishment (LFEE) in 1836. His invention was taken up by its Superintendent James Braidwood. Braidwood conducted his own tests and deemed them to be successful.

The smoke-hood, which covered the whole of the upper body, was made of leather. Enclosing the wearer’s head it reached down to their waist were it was secured by a belt. The arms reached down to the wrists and were secured about the cuffs by string. Two glass eye-pieces afforded the wearer uninterrupted vision.

Fresh air was supplied via a length of hose attached to the back of the hood. A bellows forced air into the hood with excess pressure escaping via the waist and wrists. As the air was being forced in it inflated the hood and prevented smoke from entering. Formally adopted, the hood was first used in anger at a fire in Basing Lane on the 22^nd December the same year. Details of how many times it was actually used remains scarce but Braidwood’s reported to his Insurance Committee stated that its use in vaults, cellars or ships holds: “this dress is invaluable”.

Smoke helmet in a training drill at the MFB Southwark HQ.

Progress over the next 50 years can be regarded as limited but Capt. Eyre Massey Shaw (who took over from Braidwood after his death at a fire in Tooley Street) became the first Chief Officer of the new Metropolitan Fire Brigade. Progress with smoke hood development came around 1875 when he and a Professor Tyndall devised, and introduced, a ‘smoke cap’ which was, in fact, the first respirator. The earlier hoods were considered primitive. It was thought that a respirator would filter smoke and other gases and be effective under all conditions. It was not realised that the greatest danger to firemen, wearing such equipment, was oxygen deficiency! Nothing but a supplementary air supply, or oxygen, could do the job required.

Shaw next gave his blessing to Dr Fisher’s patent smoke mask in 1878. Made of light, imperishable, material, when dipped into hot water made it plastic. Placed on quickly it could be adapted to closely fit the fireman’s face. It was made with strong glasses covering the eyes and secured to the face by a buckled strap. The whole mask weighed only a few ounces and by Victorian standards was considered reasonably efficient.

By 1900 a German company, Siebe Gorman, had supplied the brigade with an improved smoke helmet and accessories. It comprised a leather smoke helmet, double acting foot bellows air pump, canvas kit bag containing 120 ft of air hose, 120 ft. of security rope and body harness. They had introduced smoke helmets, based on the principle of a deep-sea diver’s breathing system. Air entered the helmet through breathing tubes, which were connected to a set of bellows at each side and operated by a second person. A neck curtain attached to the helmet was tucked into the fireman’s tunic, providing a reasonably air-tight seal. However, the equipment was very restrictive as firemen could only go as far as the air hose allowed.

In 1912 ten additional pairs of smoke helmets, of the self-contained type, were purchased to ensure it could be available in any part of London without undue delay. That said, in the Chief Officer’s report of that year “148 individuals were endangered at fires and of these 43 were rescued by firemen.” In the vast majority of cases firemen had, of course, to endure the punishing effects of smoke. His report made no mention if smoke-hoods made any material difference to the rescues carried out, or even if they were used?

With an increased use of motorised fire engines the following year a decision was made to purchase two additional, specialist, motorised fire engines (emergency tenders). One was under construction and would be allocated to the No 1 station at the Southwark headquarters. A second would be located at the Superintendent’s station of Clerkenwell once built.

The London Fire Brigade’s first emergency tender with its Proto wearing firemen
and located at the No 1 station-Southwark. (Photo circa 1914)

The brigade’s policy on smoke-hoods was they were allocated to thirteen fire stations; each with two hoods carried on a fire engine. Smoke hood training was restricted to a relative few firemen, only those serving at those stations. The brigade’s total stock of smoke-hoods stood at twenty six sets. However, there continued use was brought to a sudden end in 1913.

On the 13^th March that year Firemen Robert. L. Libby and William McLaren died during an incident at Pembridge Villas. W11 near Notting Hill. The two men had entered a sewer wearing smoke hoods (it is assumed) to rescue a sewer worker, but that is not certain. What is beyond doubt is that the two firemen died. Both asphyxiated because of gas within the sewer. As a direct result of their deaths the efficacy of all the self-contained smoke hoods raised much nervousness about their continued use. Henceforth the practice of carrying smoke hoods was discontinued and they were removed from stations.

The Brigade urgently required a better system of breathing apparatus. Under existing UK legislation (1910 and 1911), it was compulsory for the vast majority of British collieries to have access to self-contained breathing apparatus. The London Fire Brigade took upon itself to adopt the mine rescue teams’ most successful system. It remained in use (albeit modified over time) for more than sixty years.

A early breathing apparatus course at the Southwark headquarters and training in the Proto set.

The first practical breathing apparatus set, for rescue and salvage work in coal mines, had been invented by Henry Fleuss, an Englishman. He had become interested in diving equipment whilst working for the P&O steamship company. His first apparatus, of 1879, was a primitive self-contained underwater breathing apparatus. Divers would carry a self-contained compressed oxygen supply, plus a contrivance to recover (regenerate) oxygen from exhaled carbon dioxide. Fleuss subsequently obtained patents and started his own company. He also collaborated with Siebe, Gorman & Co. of London, the premier makers of diving equipment. The Fleuss apparatus was adapted for use in mines. Enabling the wearers to survive in a poisonous atmosphere underground.

Austria and Germany had both been at the forefront of efforts to develop breathing apparatus for use in irrespirable atmospheres (underground) during the 1890s and into the 1900s. The first British models began to appear in the early 1900s. The ‘Proto’ was introduced in 1906, manufactured by Siebe Gorman.

The Proto

It was a self-contained system, consisting of a cylinder of oxygen and an air reservoir or breathing bag containing an absorbent. This removed the exhaled carbon dioxide it was mixed with a fresh supply of oxygen from the cylinder and reused. The apparatus included a separate mouthpiece through which to breathe, a nose clip and rubber goggles to protect the eyes. Although requiring special training, it was swiftly adopted by the Brigade and issued to the first emergency tender crews.

The benefit of this new breathing apparatus for firemen was that several could now work together as a team when wearing the oxygen sets. By 1916, there were some 913 Proto sets in use across Britain. The London Fire Brigade only account for around 2% of that total. The age of the smoke eating fireman remained the order of the day.

The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 had a number of significant impacts on the Brigade, not least the number of firemen, and officers, who returned to the ‘colours’ either as reservist or volunteered to fight for King and Country. With the War effort there was no funding available to see an expansion of breathing apparatus to more London fireman. According to the Brigade’s summary of stations and appliances published in 1919 it still only had the one petrol motor emergency tender and 36 sets of Proto breathing apparatus which, interestingly, were still referred to as ‘smoke helmets’!

1919 saw the promotion of Arthur Dyer to become the Brigade’s Chief Officer. The continuous duty of firemen had been approved to be changed to a two watch system the following year and with it the number of breathing apparatus trained firemen doubled. The second emergency tender was finally placed into service. Although in looks it took on the appearance of an adapted fire engine that remained open to the elements. The Proto set was proving its worth, although from the wearers point of view it was prone to overheat and the oxygen supply was painful to inhale. Dyer proved himself to be a remarkable Chief Officer, a more than competent fireman and leader of his men. However, it is worth noting that there was no general expansion in the acquisition of, or the use of, breathing.

The ‘open’ emergency tender and crew of station 66-Clerkenwell.

Cmdr. Aylmer Firebrace RN. joined the London Fire Brigade as an officer entrant the same year Dyer was appointed Chief Officer. Firebrace would rise, not only to command London prior to the outbreak of WWII, but would lead the British fire service during the conflict. In 1941 he was instrumental, along with his deputy Frederick Delve, in establishing the UK’s National Fire Service. Reflecting of his early years of service he had these comments regarding attitudes to breathing apparatus.

BA wearing London firemen of the late 1920’s and 1930s when the brass helmets were phased out and the new black cork helmets took their place.

“Fireman can, of course, be protected from smoke by the use of breathing apparatus, but we are not yet in the era; though with the advance in science it is bound to come. A time when every fireman has his own personal set of really light, efficient apparatus.” “But the apparatus is bulky and heavy, some thirty-one pounds, and a handicap to firefighting activity.”

Top: BA training at the Southwark headquarters.
Lower: The first enclosed BA carrying pump at the Southwark headquarters.

However, Firebrace was swift to praise the performance of his BA firemen too. He reported on the quick thinking of a BA crew who saved the lives of two sewer men. An emergency tender crew had been summoned to rescue two men overcome in the sewer some 140 ft. below ground level. The gas-plant used for pumping fresh air into the sewer, whilst the men worked below, failed. First descending and then walking half a mile through sewage the team discovered two in a state of collapse. The Sub Officer leading the team detailed two men to carry one of the casualties to the entrance and fresh air. He carried the other man unaided. On his return he noted the man had stopped breathing. Filling his Proto breathing bag with oxygen he then disconnected the oxygen cylinder from the set and administered oxygen to the unconscious man. As the man’s breathing grew stronger he was carried to the entrance and raised to the surface. Both men survived their ordeal. Firebrace’s comment on the extraordinary rescue was; “Only a stout-hearted man, complete master of his equipment, would have done this.”

It was not until 1934 that progress in the greater availably of breathing apparatus was felt across the brigade. Under its new Chief Officer, Major Cyril Morris MC. the London County Council’s Fire Brigade Committee approve the reorganisation of the brigade. In addition to improved appliance design and the introduction of dual purpose fire engine with 50 ft. wheeled escape the brigade introduced ten enclosed breathing apparatus pumps, each carrying thee Proto sets.

The BA room of the new headquarters station at Lambeth. 1937.

In 1937 the new headquarters of the London Fire Brigade was formally opened by King George VI accompanied by Queen Elizabeth. The bespoke, state of the art headquarters saw a dedicated brigade workshops incorporated into the design and Lambeth became the Brigade’s training school, both for new recruits and for breathing apparatus training. A smoke and heat training facility was included in the specification and was located in the basement under the main yard.

Lambeth fire station had the latest enclosed, BA carrying, limousine pumps plus one of the two emergency tenders. On the 12^th July 1938 a serious leakage of ammonia occurred at the Eldorado ice cream factory in Stamford Street, SE1. An incident which resulted in questions being asked in Parliament. Yet whilst the growth in acquiring breathing apparatus continued firemen had no gas-tight clothing to protect them from the dangerous effects of chemicals, most notably ammonia. A gas that has very unpleasant effects on the skin, attacking any places on the body liable to perspiration.

The ammonia escape involved much of this extensive factory. An escape of gas that would see 60 people removed to hospital for treatment, 15 of whom had to be detained. With Lambeth and Southwark’s crews summoned it fell to the emergency tender crew, whose Proto sets could be adapted to take full-faces masks, to take a briefing from the factory engineers to shut off the supply. With limited body protection the fireman had to smear a thick coating of ammonia resistant ointment to their necks, ears and hands before entering the white ammonia mist. It would not be until the 1950s that the Brigade were equipment with gas tight suits (Delta suits) to wear when dealing with such incidents.

Preparations for war had started in the mid-1930s. The enrolment in excess 25,000 Auxiliary Fire Service (AFS) firefighters, both men and women, expanded the service across London to previously unseen levels. In 1937, the government passed legislation to enable the establishment of an AFS of volunteers to support the regular fire brigades in the event of war. By September 1939 the AFS had over 200,000 members, some of whom were equipped with pumps pulled by cars, or London taxis painted grey, as fire engines were in such short supply. However, the use of breathing apparatus remainded the domain of the regular London firemen.

WWII

Following the declaration of war there followed a considerable lull when the anticipated enemy attacks on the UK, and in particular London, never materialised. Termed the ‘phoney war’ AFS firefighters received both press and public ridicule and were frequently referred to as ‘war dodgers!’ However, both regular firemen and the AFS firefighters were at the forefront of danger with the start of the Blitz in September 1940. Throughout that time, and until the creation of the National Fire Service (NFS) in August 1941, London’s regular firemen maintained all BA duties.

Breathing aparatus training at the Lambeth headquarters. 1940s.

With the formation of the NFS the Siebe Gorman Salvus Mk VI breathing apparatus was a light oxygen rebreather set introduced into the London Region (NFS) and many of these sets supplemented the Proto sets across greater London’s fire stations. Their cooler boxes were marked ‘NFS’. Designed to last 30 minutes in an irrespirable atmosphere although it worked on the same principles of the Proto IV sets they were not interchangeable.

King George VI talking to BA fireman at the Lambeth headquarters. NFS.

The general design and layout of the Proto breathing apparatus sets up to, and including, the Mark IV had not changed to any great extent. Improvements were made with each successive ‘mark’ and these included such things as the change from caustic soda to ‘Protosorb’ and the introduction of a small breathing bag, and the carrying of the pressure gauge in a pocket on the shoulder instead of in front of the breathing bag.

BA instructor wear his compressed air set, firemen exiting the smoke chamber
in Proto. NFS. Circa 1942.

Additionally, during this time another type of breathing apparatus came upon the scene. Compressed air sets were developed during the Second World War and the LFB, part of the NFS, tested some of the early versions at the Lambeth headquarters. Photographic evidence shows the ‘Roberts’ set in use in a training role. If they were accepted into general operational service the records of when and where are scarce. Clearly some were used by BA instructional staff conducting Proto BA training at the Lambeth headquarters, but the outcome of trials are vague.

Return to Local Authority control

On the first April 1948 the London Fire Brigade returned to local authority control, the London County Council. The Brigade, in common with others, came under the supervision of the Home Office regarding its standards of efficiency, appliances and equipment, including breathing apparatus. Recovering from the war left the Brigade in a very poor financial state. No new stations would be built before 1956. Some stations still ran with NFS appliances and the BA carried comprised a mix of both Salvus and Proto sets. The two emergency tenders retained their Proto sets and a couple of compressed air sets.

Gordon Smith was a post war London fireman. He was stationed at the Bishopsgate station. He shares some of his experiences of BA from those times.

“I recall, most of my training was done at my home station, Bishopsgate. First it was verbal and written questions on the Proto breathing apparatus. The capacity of the cylinder and the pressure, the flow rate in litres, the duration of the oxygen at two and a half litres per minute. Then the Protosorb, the coolant, the various valves, the donning procedure, the mouthpiece, nose clip and goggles also the entrapped procedure.

“Then would come the practical side. The wearing of the set under heavy smoke conditions, which was simulated by tying a black silk blindfold over your eyes. Then you would search a large room or series of rooms for a simulated victim. Generally you would search a space by maintaining contact with the wall, until you got back to your entry point, then diagonally from corner to corner. When you walked, or rather ‘shuffled’, you moved one foot cautiously ahead, testing the floor, then the other leg, in an outward sweeping movement, forward until it was beside your other foot.

If you hadn’t gone through the floor by then you took another step. Of course, our guvnor liked to make it a little more exciting so a few hazards were added. When searching the drill yard the boards would be lifted from the suction pit, drain covers would be missing and there would someone creeping up behind you who would crack open your bypass valve, to simulate that you had hooked it on something. All this training could take a good six months to complete to the satisfaction of the watch Station Officer.

For the training the BA had to be taken ‘off the run’ (unavailable). It could be two hours before we could put it back operationally. We only had two Proto sets and one Salvus set on the Pump. There was no BA on the open PE. There may have been a more authoritative BA testing unit somewhere in 1948 but I don’t remember where? I seem to remember entering a system of concrete piping wearing BA, maybe the Lambeth headquarters, where it was necessary to crawl on all fours before meeting an obstruction. Then it was necessary to loosen the breathing bag and push it ahead of you and over the obstruction so you could then squeeze yourself over it. There was a heat source to make it more challenging.”

In December 1949 he attended the ill-fated Covent Garden fire. He was one of many sent below ground to fight the blaze.

“If we had already been exposed to smoke, which was the norm, before we rigged we would take a few breaths of oxygen through the mouthpiece before putting on the nose-clip, to clear our lungs. Our BA was the Proto one hour set including its cylinder containing 6 cubic feet of oxygen at 1800 psi. If you became trapped you were taught to turn off the main valve and use the bypass valve to supply the bag with the oxygen needed.”

The Salvas sets (breathing bags at their sides) at the fatal fire in
Covent Garden, December 1949. Station Officer Charles Fisher
died in the basement whilst wearing his Salvus BA set.

The BA ‘Bowler’.

In the mid-1950s the Chiek Officer, Frederick Delve, introduced a new style fire helmet for the BA riders of the Brigade’s two wemergeny tenders, based at Clerkenwell and Lambeth fire station. Due to its shape it was soon nicked-named the ‘bowler’.

Whilst the helmet proved poplar with the firemen, especially when working in confined or restricted spaces with breathing apparatus, the helmet fell foul of the national standards governing the style and specifications of UK firemens helmet design. It was considered it lacked adequate neck protection, which the standard issue helmet afforded.

1956. Fireman Les Porter, an ET fireman from Lambeth, wearing the new style ‘bowler’ BA helmet.

By the late 1950s the Brigade had to withdraw the helmets from operational use due to the conflict with national helmet design.

An ET crew, wearing their ‘bowlers’ standing by with a station BA crew at the Smithfield Meat Market fire in 1958.

1958. A BA watershed

In January 1958 a massive fire swept through the Smithfield Meat Market in the City of London. Such was the intensity of that fire that it spread through two and a half acres of underground passages before involving the upper floors. Finally all BA crews were forced to withdraw and they had to surround the blaze. A blaze which lead to the collapsed of the old market buildings. It was a fire that was ultimately fought by 1,700 firemen and officers. Some 389 fire engines and ancillary vehicles attended the incident. Two dozen firefighters were injured at ‘Smithfield’s’, two tragically died.

In the early stages of the fire firemen wearing Proto breathing apparatus were committed into the basement to seek out the fire and extinguish it. John Bishop was an acting Station Officer and one of those first on the scene. His pump’s crew were one of scores to enter the Smithfield basement. This is his own story:

The re-drawing of breathing apparatus procedures.

Following Smithfield reports were submitted to the Fire Brigade Committee of the London County Council by Chief Officer Delve. Once again lessons were to be learned, lessons that could not be ignored. Some of the problems at Smithfield, regarding BA procedures, had occurred at two previous fires at Covent Garden. A revised LFB procedure was set up in 1956 following the second fatal Covent Garden Fire. This involved the provision of a BA Control Point. At Smithfield it was located in Charterhouse Lane. It detailed a record of the entry of men wearing BA into the incident however, the BA Control Point consisted of no more than a simple blackboard and white chalk. It recorded: name, station/location, time of entry and time due out.

As basic as it was it proved invaluable. It indicated, later, in the incident that two men were missing and overdue. However, following the tragic loss of life at Smithfield there were concerted calls for a more comprehensive schedule of BA procedures to be formulated. These calls came from Delve himself, his deputy Leslie Leete and Mr John Horner, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union.

A blackboard and white chalk serves as the BA control board at the Smithfield fire. It monitored crews locations
and not individual BA wearers.

Later that same year a Fire Service Circular (FSC) 37/1958 was issued. It detailed the findings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommended the following:-

Tallies for BA sets;
A Stage I and Stage II control procedure for recording & supervising BA wearers:
The duties of a control operator:
The procedure to be followed by crews:
A main control procedure.

BA controls procedures being demonstated together with the ‘Southhampton’commications equipment. The images shows Stage II procedure with an ’emergency’ crews standing by (D61).

Smithfield brought about the introduction of the Mark V Proto set. The set saw some major changes. The weight of set was reduced by 6 lbs (2.7 kilos) down to about 27 lbs (12.2 kilos). The reduction was achieved by the use a terylene fabric for the breathing bag and harness and using alloy steel for the oxygen cylinder. Additionally there were changes to the filter, valves and the by-pass valve. The main valve became the only valve operated by a hand wheel and it was no longer possible to confuse the controls. There was also a push button operated by-pass valve and an automatic relief value on the breathing bag.

In the late 1950s gas-tight suits were added to
emergency tenders. They were worn in conjunction with
the MarkV Proto set.

Besides the changes to BA procedures the brigade increased its complete of emergency tenders by 100%. The additional tenders were placed a Greenwich and Euston fire stations. Additionally when a ‘BA required’ message was received by the control room two emergency tenders were dispatched to the incident. In some instances, dependent on the risks, additional breathing apparatus was sent at the time of the original call. A typical example was a ship fire.

On Boxing Day 1960 a call was received to a fire on the Motor Vessel ‘Twin’, moored at Hercules Wharf in Poplar. E14. The 999 call was received at 9:25 p.m. and was on Brunswick Road ground. Its pump escape and turntable ladder together with Burdett Road’s pair joined the ET’s from Clerkenwell and Greenwich, plus Lee Green’s hose laying lorry as the initial attendance. Additionally West Ham’s (a separate, adjoining, fire brigade) emergency tender was sent together with a breathing apparatus control vehicle from Clerkenwell (the Divisional Headquarters) and the major control unit from the Lambeth headquarters. The incident also attracted two senior officers from Clerkenwell.

The officer in charge made an immediate attack on the fire committing his BA crews in the knowledge he had speedy BA reserves at hand if required. Neither did he require additional fire engines to deal with the incident. At 10.10 p.m. the fire was under control. His stop message gives an indication of the severity of the fire.

Stop for the MV Twin. Hercules Wharf. Severe damage by fire to 3 crew cabins on starboard quarters, water from 2 jets and hosereel from 1 pump from hydrant. 6 x Proto BA.

In late 1962 Leslie Leete became the LFB’s new Chief Officer. Among his initial actions was the return of the Brigade’s training school to Southwark. It would be the hub of all recruit, BA and ET training until the creation of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1965 and an enlarged London Fire Brigade. The arrival of the GLC saw the part or whole amalgamation of the fire brigades surrounding the outgoing LCC’s London. Almost all of the former Middlesex brigade (which after London was the second largest brigade in the UK) was absorbed. The Brigades of East and West Ham together with Croydon were taken in wholesale. Not all the appliances or equipment taken over were of the same pattern. BA sets were one such issue with Kent having some Salvus sets and others running with Proto Mark IV sets. Croydon fire brigade had moved entirely to compressed air sets. Fortunately those firemen familiar with Proto just required familiarisation with London’s Mark V set. As part of the transition Proto Mark V sets replaced the other inherited BA sets. In addition three emergency tenders were acquired, one each from Middlesex, Croydon and West Ham, bringing the Brigade’s fleet of ET’s to seven.

Both breathing apparatus and emergency tender training returned to Southwark.

During the early 1960s an addition to existing Proto breathing apparatus came into service; compressed air (CABA). Supplied by Siebe Gorman the set was normally intended for the use of senior officers at major fires and where only short inspections of the progress/actions of Proto firemen was necessary. The set provided approximately half an hour of air, however, if the wearer was working hard the amount of time would be much reduced. The set comprised a full face mask, an air cylinder (carried vertically on the back) and the facility to allow the wearer to talk to other crew members.

The ‘rat-run’ at Southwark formed an intergral part of the practical training for BA courses.
Both heat and smoke could be added to this underground obstacle course.

At the end of the 1960s Proto BA remained the dominant set but there were three types of compressed air sets in use in the Brigade. The most common being Siebe Gorman but Roberts and Normalair sets had also been purchased.

In the last months of Leets’s service London had its worst post war ship fire. In August 1969 the SS Paraguay Star, moored at the Royal Victoria Dock. E 16 caught fire. Twenty pumps, a foam tender and both the Brigade’s fireboats (Massey Shaw and Firebrace) attended the refrigerated cargo/passenger ship (10,800 tons). The fire centred on the ships engine room and Proto crews experienced the most punishing heat and dense oily smoke whilst gaining access into the ship. As with many such protracted and involved BA incidents the BA Incident Box was summoned and spare oxygen cylinders sent to the scene. It facilitated BA wearers testing their sets, changing cylinders before being recommitted into the ship.

New era.

The arrival of the 1970s heralded a new era. An era where the arrival of a new Chief Officer brought change, especially in regard to breathing apparatus. The Proto set would be consigned to the history books and compressed air sets would replace them in a massive expansion of their allocation. Joe Milner had been the former Chief Officer of the Honk Kong fire service. When asked about his priorities on taking on the role of London’s new Chief he said that although helmets and clothing were some insurance against injury, not enough attention had been given to preventing the damage done to firemen’s lungs. In Hong Kong he had ensured that there was one breathing apparatus set for very two men on duty. London firemen were riding with a ratio of one set for every four men on duty.

Joe Milner (with pipe) talking to BA firemen at the scene of a north London blaze.

The new Chief Officer quickly established his authority, but anyone left thinking the ‘new broom’ was going to swept away the practices of the past overnight with a programme of rapid reforms were disappointed. He was also a very regular face on the fireground and proved himself a competent operational officer and swiftly won the respect of his men. He commanded from the front and in August 1971 directed firefighting operations at London biggest blaze of the decade at Tooley Street. The second of two post war 50 pump fires.

The vast, disused, cold store warehouse fire involved breathing apparatus from the off. The severest of conditions tested wave after wave of Proto firemen attempting to enter the building and seek the heart of the blaze. It was not the only thing being tested. The recently introduced, new style, BA guidelines were given their baptism by fire. Many of the exhausted Proto crews were affected by the excessive heat and humidity. Late in the afternoon a contractor’s acetylene cylinder exploded. The resultant flashover caught three BA firemen working from a covered Bridgeway. All were injured and one was rushed to hospital suffering serious burns to his hands and face.

By 1972 Joe Milner was really getting into his stride. It was the year that his promise of more breathing apparatus for firemen was delivered. The ‘Airmaster’ compressed air (CA) breathing apparatus sets were introduced initially into pump-escapes and proto sets carried on pumps. Later the Proto was reduced to two sets with two additional CA sets carried. Eventually four CA sets were carried on every front line appliance (PE and pumps). The ‘Airmaster’ was subsequently replaced by the phased introduction of the Siebe Gorman ‘Firefighter’ set around 1979.

1970s. LFB Compressed air wearers exiting from a major blaze at Ironmongers Row. London.

…after the wearing came the testing and maintenance of the Proto set back at the station.

Enter the compressed air ‘Airmaster’ sets.

With the growth in chemical incidents Milner also oversaw the introduction of a Chemical Incident Unit into the operational fleet. It attended both chemical incidents and was mobilised to all radiation incidents. Among its crews duties were the safe decontamination of BA crews committed to such incidents. Milner also added the word ‘rescue’ to the title of emergency tenders. Henceforth they were called ‘emergency rescue tenders’.

With the widespread allocation of compressed air breathing apparatus to all front line appliances its use was very much the norm rather the exception. The age of the ‘smoke-eater’ if not totally passed their days were numbered. BA became an integral part of the fireman’s everyday operational kit.

Shoreditch (C21) crews use BA sets where firemen once stood and took in the smoke!

Such was the importance of breathing apparatus to the fireman’s ‘job’ that the Fire Brigade’s Union cited it as a central plank in their case to secure a much overdue pay rises for firemen nationally. The case fell on deaf ears and the first national strike stated in November 1977. It would last until January 1978. Firemen across London, whilst on strike, carried their BA sets in their private cars to the scene of fires where there was a risk to life.

(London first woman firefighter joined the Brigade in 1982; the term fireman was officially replaced with ‘firefighter’ in all formal Brigade contracts by the late 1980s.)

The 80s & 90s

In all instances serious fires underground were difficult, challenging and frequently dangerous. On every occasion breathing apparatus was necessity to extinguish the fire. A fire at the Oxford Street underground station was no exception. In November 1984 a blaze started in building materials stored in a closed-off passageway between the northbound Bakerloo and Victoria line platforms. It lead to many passengers being hospitalised with smoke inhalation. Such was the damage caused that the Victoria line had to be closed between Warren Street and Victoria for nearly a month. Something which gives an indication of the tremendous determination required of the BA firefighters in getting to grips with the blaze. (As a direct result a complete ban on smoking all sub-surface stations was introduced in February 1985.)

Kings Cross underground fire. November 1987.

On the 18 November 1987, at approximately 19:30 p.m. a fire broke out at King’s Cross underground station, a major interchange on the London underground. The fire started on a wooden escalator serving the Piccadilly line when at 19:45 p.m. it erupted in a flashover into the underground ticket hall. The fire would kill 31 people, including Station Officer Townsley from Soho fire station and injure 100, some critically. It was the most significant BA fire of the decade. Whilst the conditions endured by the firefighters were horrendous their compressed air breathing apparatus sets stood up to the challenges presented. However, a number firefighters were overcome with heat exhaustion. What was found wanting was the outdated fire kit of the firefighters, kit that had hardly changed since the arrival of the early Proto sets? As a direct result of this fire improved fire kit was introduced, kit that has continued to be modified and updated to the present day.

A new style automatic distress signal unit was introduced on all breathing apparatus sets in 1990. The device would operate when the wearer is immobile for more than 20 seconds.

An exhausted firefighter administered oxygen at the Gillender Street fire.

On 10^th July 1991 two firefighters died whilst wearing BA at a major fire at Gillender Street, E3. Fire had broken out in a document storage warehouse in the early afternoon. Before the fire was brought under control 40 pumping and specialist appliances attended. The incident took over six to contain. It was during the course of firefighting operations that a BA team were instructed to lay out a BA main guide line to the scene of the fire on a second floor mezzanine. It was whilst carrying out this activity that two firefighters (Terence James Hunt and David John Stokoe) from Silvertown fire station lost their lives.

Their deaths resulted in an immediate inquiry and investigation not only by the Brigade, the Fire Brigade Union but the Health and Safety Executive. Such was design of the building and its structure the fire generated punishing conditions of intense heat and dense smoke making the incident particularly difficult.

The internal report identified a number of areas of concern both of basic ‘firemanship’; departures from procedures and practical problems with the use of BA. Not least of the matters identified was issues with Operation 91 (that covered all matters BA related). The report suggest areas of it required revision and amendment. It was stated that a longer duration breathing apparatus set would have been an advantage (EDBA) although at the time the Brigade was only evaluating such equipment.

Health and Safety Executive, at the conclusion of their investigation, took the unprecedented action of serving two improvement notices on the Brigade. It brought about a radical review of BA practices and the standing of its training regime. However, of note the Brigade’s investigation also highlighted areas of excellence? One was those mentioned were East Ham’s Emergency Rescue Tender crew whose actions and professionalism in attacking the fire greatly aided the headway in extinguishing it. Finally the commitment and professionalism of a large number of the firefighters and officers, in such difficult and complicated circumstances, was considered worthy of the highest admiration and praise.

But the issuing of the Improvement Notices acted as a watershed, particularly in regard to BA training at all levels.

ERT were rebranded as Fire Rescue units with enhanced rescue capability and extended duration breathing apparatus sets.

Southwark Training Centre received approval for a multi-million pound make-over and refurbishment in 1992. It’s the first major overall at Southwark since its creation by Capt. Shaw in 1878. A pilot study also starts on the creation of a bespoke, hi-tech, firehouse complex at Southwark and the creation of the Brigade’s first ‘real-fire’ training facility.

The findings of a radical review of the LFB’s firefighter recruit training syllabus is agreed. Recruits had previously be trained in BA at the end of their course and prior to going to their stations. They now received that training at the mid-point, thereafter performed practical ladder drills wearing BA and following BA procedures. Recruits finished their basic training with a visit to the Fire Service College-Morton in Marsh to undergo ‘real fire training’ which was assessable.

A mobile heat and smoke training unit was introduced and made available to enhance station BA training.

Into the new millennium

2002- a change of fire kit but the task of getting in with BA remained the same.

After 12 years of research and development, in 2003, (and at a final cost of £22 million) the ‘Firehouse’ at the refurbished and modernised Southwark Training Centre goes live. It lasted less than two years! After a second fire in the complex it was necessary to stop all ‘real fire training’. The facility could only be used for ‘cold’ BA training. It was later demolished when the whole of the Southwark site was sold and the vast majority of Brigade training had been outsourced.

Not all was smothing sailing regarding BA especially if you happened to be a woman firefighter. There were serious issues of adequate PPE. Some women had to make do with ill-fitting kit. Not least were incorrectly fitting helmets, tunics and BA facemasks. The Brigade undertook to work nationally to provide ALL firefighters with the best possible gear regardless of size, gender or ethnicity.

At the same time the Brigade undertook improvements to its Fire Rescue Unit (FRU) fleet. They were to be increased from five to seven with enhanced essential specialist equipment in addition to their BA role. In December 2003 25 Draeger extended duration sets relaced the old sets on the FRU’s. They would extend a firefighter’s working time to a nominal 75 minutes. In addition the set was fitted a bodyguard intergrated pressure gauge which provided digital information toalart the wearer when to get out when conditions became unsafe.

In 2004 London saw the creation of the ‘London Resiliance Forum’. It meant, in practical terms. that more money was allocated to special clothing and equipment to make sure specially trained firefighters are able to deal with any kind of disaster.

BA Telemetry

(The process of recording and transmitting the readings of an instrument.)

In 2010, following research, it was established it was possible to interference (with the telemetry component of breathing apparatus) using a mobile handset, dongle or other 4G mobile device within a certain distance. This allowed live and relevant data to be transmitted and received between a remote monitoring point and the breathing apparatus wearer for the first time.

The LFB introduced telemetry procedures for their BA equipment. The telemetry was incorporated in BA command and control and BA equipment procedures.

Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA)

The Brigades current standard duration breathing apparatus has only one cylinder. The set weighs about 15kgs. When a firefighter is breathing normally a SDBA they should get about 31 minutes of air time. But, if the firefighter is working hard and breathing heavily the cylinder won’t necessarily last that long.

Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA)

To use extended duration breathing apparatus firefighters must have completed specialist training. EDBA sets have two cylinders and weigh around 23kgs.

A firefighter in EDBA should get 47 minutes of air time. But the same rules apply if the firefighter is working hard and breathing heavily.

EDBA is usually brought out when firefighters have to travel longer distances using breathing apparatus, like a train stuck in a tunnel.

Since the Smithfield fire (1958) whenever firefighters are committed using breathing apparatus a Breathing Apparatus Entry Control (BAEC) is established. The system tracks who’s gone in and who’s come out.

(Note. 1.Currently there is one contract in place with Dräger Ltd for the supply of component parts for BA, cylinders and telemetry equipment. This is due to expire on 1 July 2021. 2. The disparity between the duration of the EDBA set (75 minutes and 45 minutes) is not easy to explain. The current duraton is given at 45 minutes.)

Grenfell

The fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017 took the lives of 72 people. It left hundreds more with both physical and psychological injuries. Whilst firefighters are trained to respond to fires in residential high rise buildings this incident was of a scale and rapidity that was exceptional. Those failures created a set of conditions not previously experienced by the Brigade. It provided unique challenges for the Brigade and none more so than in its use of breathing apparatus.

The first on the scene, although experienced, were not of senior rank. They faced with a situation for which they had not been properly prepared or trained. In the resulting, ongoing, public inquiry it was established none seem to have been able to conceive of the possibility of a general failure of compartmentation or of a need for mass evacuation. The Inquiry looked, in microscopic precision, at the actions of individuals almost minute by minute. A few were found to be wanting but in publishing an interim report the Chairman, a retired High Court judge, to pains to state;

“The firefighters who attended the tower displayed extraordinary courage and selfless devotion to duty.”

Grenfell-where London firefighter BA crews put themselves in harm’s way-only to do it again
at the Grenfell Inquiry when individual actions were placed under a micoscope.

In the aftermath the LFB, following its examination of the breathing apparatus and telemetry data gathered was able to identify the composition of all the BA teams deployed into Grenfell Tower. A detailed analysis of the data, including a comparison of the effectiveness of SDBA and EDBA in such circumstances was commenced in 2019 to identify learning that may inform operational procedures and / or the design of BA equipment in the future.

The training of all station-based firefighters begun the same year. Babcock Training Services (The LFB’s training provider) delivered half day briefings on fire safety in high-rise premises including elements of construction, compartmentation, firefighting facilities, evacuation strategies and ventilation systems. A computer-based training package and one day face-to-face training session covering fire safety in commercial premises is scheduled to take place in the financial year 20/21. Following Grenfell, and as the Brigade’s outsourced training arrangements have been in place for a number of years, the LFB commissioned an independent review of training by Ribband Star Consultancy Limited. A report was presented to Commissioner’s Board on 9 October 2019.

After Grenfell, the Brigade also began investigating the use of fire escape hoods to mitigate the risk of smoke inhalation for occupants attempting to escape or being rescued. The hoods were introduced in November 2018 and provide up to 15 minutes protection for the wearer. The hoods are attached to every BA set. They have used to assist in the rescue of 25 members of the public at October 2019. Investigations are taking place to see if additional fire escape hoods could be provided in designated grab packs on frontline appliances and used on occupants in the event an evacuation.

Problems with BA policy were discovered. A preliminary report to the LFB Commissioner noted that some elements of BA operations were not fully aligned to the Brigade’s operational procedures as set out in its operational BA policy.

The Brigade has since replaced its bi-annual two day BA course and the bi-annual half day confirmation of BA skills course. From April 2019 firefighters receive a new annual two day firefighting course; designed to increase firefighter awareness and understanding of tactical ventilation, scene survey, weight of attack and the importance of correct BA procedures.

The outcomes of its BA analysis will inform the development of operational procedures and BA equipment in the future. The Brigade is also investigating a number of events related to BA operations including the removal of personal facemasks to provide air to residents seeking to evacuate the building via the compromised stairwell, leading to exposure of the products of combustion.

Working with Imperial College they hope to establish an independent long term respiratory health study for firefighters who attended the Grenfell Tower incident. This study has the support of the Fire Brigades Union and is the largest of its kind to date, into the potential long-term effects of firefighting.

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was suspended in March 2020 “until further notice” following the escalation in the country’s response to the growing coronavirus crisis. The history of the LFB’s continues to be written.

The story of London’s fire brigade breathing apparatus progress continues…

An iconic image of London firemen wearing their Proto sets.

In memoriam

18^th March 1913. Pembridge Villas. W11

Fireman Robert L. Libby

Fireman William McLare

20^th December 1949. Covent Garden Market. WC2.

Station Officer Charles Fisher

22^nd July 1956. Kensington High Street.

Leading Fireman Frederick Willoughy

23^rd January 1958. Smithfield Meat Market. EC1.

Station Officer Jack Fourt-Wells

Fireman Richard Stocking

8^th March 1968. Kings Road. SW3.

Fireman Brian O’Connell-Hutchings

Fireman Colin Comber

26^th January 1980. Regent Dock Canal.

Leading Fireman Stephen Maynard

30^th April 1981. Broadway, Wimbledon.

Fireman Anthony Marshall

27^th April 1981. St Georges Hospital. Tooting

Fireman Barry Trussell

10^th July 1991. Gillender Street.E3.

Firefighter Terence Hunt

Firefighter David Stokoe

20^th July 2004. Bethnal Green Road.

Firefighter Bill Faust

Firefighter Adam Meere

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